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Abstract—In this paper, we seek to identity how
mathematical and economic analysis can be used to
gain insights about the mutation of social groups. Group
mutability has been studied in multiple domains, with
insights generated on significant factors at differing
scales. Mathematical modeling enables the simultane-
ous study of such phenomena, understanding interac-
tions and generating hypotheses for experiments. In
particular, we focus on group fracture, where indi-
viduals leave groups of which they are members. For
example, this can be due to perceived differences with
other group members due to norm related conflict (such
as extreme actions by some members). Our aim is
to consider simple mathematical models incorporating
a selection of social and psychological theory which
describes these phenomena as a way to understand
their interplay, and describe the trade-offs and chal-
lenges. This will help a federation model the behavior
of extremist groups, and determine not only when an
intervention is necessary, but also the best course of
action to take to induce the fracture of such groups.
This paper is an exploratory investigation into methods
of achieving this goal and evaluating the usefulness of
the outputs to federations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The stability of groups is an emerging topic of study
in differing contexts (see [1] for a summary). While
some interest is focused on the evolution of cooperation
[2], [3] and groups in a biological and evolutionary
setting, there is significant interest in understanding
the predictors of group stability and mutation in man-
agement and counterterrorism [4] settings. The effect of
different phenomena on group behavior and dynamics,
across individual to group scales, has been the subject
of much mathematical study since the 1940’s [5] which
has typically employed methods from physics and game
theory. The physics-inspired approaches provide insight
mainly through simulation (e.g., [6], [7]), and involve
many parameters, while the game theoretic models ei-
ther directly focus on simple two-player ultimatum and
prisoner’s dilemma games [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], or
bespoke games relevant to particular scenarios (e.g.,
group conflict [13], [14], [15]). In the intervening time,
many micro-economic models have been developed to
describe specific group-dependent actions [16], [17], [18],
[19]. Recently, Kranton [20] provided a roadmap for the
integration of these models to create a meta-model for
group behavior. In this paper, we use this roadmap to
develop a mathematical theory of group fracture and
stability. This will help us to identify stable groups
and their most vulnerable/reluctant group members, and
serve as a basis for reasoning about the interactions
of the aforementioned phenomena. We categorize these
phenomena based on their social dependence: interde-
pendent phenomena are dependent on the choices and
actions of other group members, while independent phe-
nomena are related to the psychology and perception of
the individual irrespective of other group members.
A. Interdependent group-based phenomena
It has been observed that individuals exhibit coop-
erative, sometimes costly behavior to maintain groups
[2] in differing contexts, even if the gains (material,
reputational, or otherwise) are not immediate [21], [22],
[23]. These behaviors may be due to personal normative
beliefs or morals, or descriptive or injunctive norms.
The defining line between these two types of behavior
is the conditional preference for the action: personal
beliefs and morals may persist without any type of
reciprocity or expectation of others (i.e, they are indepen-
dent), while the effect of descriptive or injunctive norms
would be lessened without social feedback on their en-
forcement (i.e., they are interdependent). Knowledge of
group norms, social rules which define what behavior is
expected of an individual within the group as a condition
of membership [23], [24], and their effects is critical in
understanding the stability and fracture of groups.
Technically, for a behavior to be considered a social
norm, there need to be both empirical and normative
expectations (expectations about how others behave,
and how the individual believes they are expected to
behave by others), as well as conditional preference (the
behaviors critically depend on their being mirrored by
a social reference group) [25]. These norms impose a
burden on some group members, which may itself be a
source of tension for the individual (if they are onerous)
or the group itself (if they are unfair).
However, norms are not the only interdependent
group-based phenomena that may affect group muta-
bility. The choices of other members of the reference
group may have indirect effects on the choices of a group
member (i.e., act as externalities) through processes such
as social comparison.
Social comparison is a mechanism through which
individuals compare their opinions and actions with
others to gain a better and possibly accurate self-
evaluation [26]. Festinger [26] originally hypothesized
that individuals compare themselves against similar
people. One such case would be comparison against
in-group members (e.g., comparing wages against your
peers versus some other occupation). The exact effect
of a particular comparison can depend on context [27]
or group-membership [28], and it can be unidirectional
(i.e., only considering those better-off or worse-off in
the comparison) [29], [30] or multi-directional [31]. This
internal mechanism both affects individual decision-
making and, indirectly, the decision-making of others
[16], [32], [33].
Social comparison among intrinsically similar indi-
viduals may lead to the straightforward adoption of
successful behavior [34]. However, with heterogeneity
in abilities, observing the actions of others is not nec-
essarily informative of their effort (i.e., their strategy).
Thus, the effect of social comparison is a comparison
of observable actions/behaviors, or rewards, with other
group members.
Under a multi-directional model of social compari-
son, any comparison between two individuals makes
one better off and the other worse off. Those that
will fare favorably in the comparison have a natural
incentive to compare themselves against the in-group.
Thus, the question arises as to how one can explain why
individuals who might receive a negative result from
this comparison, continue to remain in groups (without
assuming a preference for group membership come what
may). This work seeks to answer this question by con-
sidering the inter-play of this phenomenon with other
that manifest at different time and population scales.
B. Independent group-based phenomena
Belonging to a group cannot just be explained through
a transactional view of group norms. Individuals may be
drawn to groups for many other reasons, which have
been extensively studied in the social and cognitive
psychology literature. While examining norms focuses
on the interdependent underpinnings of the group, many
theories have been postulated to explain non-reciprocal
(“independent”) reasons for identifying with a group.
Self-categorization theory is one such influential theory.
According to self-categorization theory [35], individu-
als can characterize themselves in different ways, with
the salience of a categorization to the individual forming
the basis of de-personalization, whereby the individual
sees themselves as an “interchangeable exemplar of a
social category” [36], and thus accept the norms of the
social group. The salience of a group to an individual
depends on the unconscious process of accentuation,
whereby differences with other groups and similarities
within the group are amplified. Given the multiplicity of
reasons affecting this accentuation, it is not unreason-
able to assume that there will be a significant amount of
heterogeneity in a social group as to extent to which each
member categorizes themselves as part of the group, and
therefore is reluctant to leave it.
While self-categorization codifies “attachment” to the
group, other factors may cause the same effect of keep-
ing members within a group (i.e., acting as friction or
stickiness which prevents individuals leaving the group).
There may exist perceived, implicit, or explicit threats to
individuals who leave a group (e.g., violence, ostracism),
either from other group members or from the out-group
(making this an independent or interdependent process
depending on the case). This may cause reluctance on
the part of the individual, keeping them in the group
even in the face of onerous norms.
C. Research Question
Any model of group mutability should incorporate
multiple social and psychological theories, including ones
that describe the relation of the self to the group (self-
categorization, social identity, etc.) and those that de-
scribe the relation of the group to its constituent individ-
uals (group norms, group cohesiveness, etc.). However,
given the complexity of human interactions, the wealth
of theory, and the differences in context, there is a trade-
off between the mathematical tractability of a model
and how closely it captures human interactions. Further-
more, and more broadly, the question of how to integrate
information about individual behavior in groups into
a model of group-level behaviors has surprisingly been
relatively neglected by previous literature.
In particular, we focus on the effect of norm-related
conflict in the fracture of a group under these conditions.
This conflict can manifest when empirical expectations
of individuals are in conflict with normative expecta-
tions, leading to the supremacy of empirical expectations
and the changing of normative expectations [25]. It
can also manifest when a specific social norm puts a
significant strain on a particular individual (conflicting
with a fairness norm), or when the burden it places
on an individual is significant enough to convince them
to leave the group (and to risk the associated negative
consequences).
D. Contribution
In this paper, we propose new analytical approaches
that aim to incorporate some of the above features
into a mathematical model, by focusing on the tensions
between an individual and their relationship with the
group to which they belong and how this influences the
stability or fracture of the group. We seek to elucidate
these tensions and trade-offs mathematically, combining
these factors so that we can capture conditions that lead
to changes in the condition of a group. Specifically, we
are interested in the stability or otherwise of groups of
non-state actors [4].
As an example, this paper will show the linkage
between mathematical theory and social phenomena
through which group stability can be assessed by way of
representations of utility. Characterizing the stability of
groups mathematically has the side-benefit of allowing a
quantification of a group-member’s relative attachment
to the group. This is especially important to characterize
for internally-stable extremist groups, where the coali-
tion may seek to tactically target particular individuals
with incentives to leave the group (e.g., monetary incen-
tives, information campaigns) so as to create division
within their structure.
It should be noted that while we borrow liberally from
the underlying assumptions of many of the underly-
ing models (as will be stated), our modeling approach
is distinct, especially, from the game-theory literature
which considers repeated interactions modeled as simple
games, as our focus is on the inter-play of many different
phenomena at different scales. This is important due to
the fractal nature of modern knowledge, especially so as
group mutability has been studied in such varied com-
munities and a meta-model will allow the simultaneous
exploitation of diverse insights, as well as facilitating
the understanding of their interplay.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
In this work, we develop utility models for individuals
that incorporate the group-based phenomena described
above. These utilities will have three broad parts:
1) Intrinsic: This is a simple cost-benefit calculation
that determines the effort the individual expends in
group-related activities. The calculation of actions is
complicated by the diverse abilities of individuals.
2) Externalities: The actions chosen by other group
members affect the perceptions of the individual and
their choice of effort/action. Thus, the actions chosen
by others act as an externality that modifies the utility,
and possibly the chosen action of an individual. This is
complicated by the limited observations of other group
members and the difficulty in inferring the reason be-
hind their actions.
3) Group-based effects: While the previous two parts
of the utility are related to individual interactions, there
are group-based effects that manifest on longer time-
scales, e.g. a utility due to attachment to groups (related
to the salience of the group), and a representative utility
related to norm-based interactions with other group
members, which may decrease the utility of a single in-
dividual to the the benefit of other group members. More
precisely, this utility models normative expectations by
the individual.
We map these types of utility into the three broad
categories outlined by Kranton [20], which are dubbed
the short, medium, and long run. In her framework,
individuals choose actions in the short run taking ex-
pectations, norms, identities, and categories to be fixed.
In the medium run, individuals can take some actions
to modify their empirical and normative expectations (to
resolve conflict) or their relative attachment to groups
(categorization). In the long run, nothing is fixed.
In the short run, we identify social comparison [26] as
one of the externality-causing phenomena and use the
mathematical framework set up by Clark and Oswald
[16]. We will also incorporate a heterogeneity of individ-
uals in terms of abilities. One of the interesting results of
such a framework is that it has been shown to implicitly
model both conventional and contrarian characteristics
in individuals [16].
In the medium run, we will consider empirical and
normative expectations [25] and group norms [37] and
their effect on group members. Normative expectations
act as a belief about expected behavior of the individual,
while empirical expectations act as an expectation of
future behavior by others. When they are in conflict,
the conditional preference property of group norms may
make an individual less likely to follow them, adopt-
ing the empirical norms instead. The various sources
of group friction/stickiness (e.g., self-categorization) are
viewed in aggregate as a measure of how willing
an individual is to suffer onerous norm-related ac-
tions/punishments. The questions investigated in this
time horizon are whether a norm is self-consistent (e.g.,
will empirical expectations match normative expecta-
tions) and whether it is unfair [38]. If the answer to any
of these questions is no, the one can predict that the
normative expectations will evolve in some way in the
long-run to resolve these conflicts (in other words, the
description of the norm is not stable). Another question
of interest is whether the burden placed on an individual
is related to their identification with the group. This
approach is inspired by Bicchieri [25].
The primary question under investigation in the long
run is whether a given group is stable under the evolved
(and thus self-consistent) normative expectations of the
medium-run. For the purpose of this study, we define
stability to mean that no member of the group would
be incentivised to leave the group. We use the model of
rational agents with clear preferences used in economics
in this definition. If it is indeed stable, and no member
will disassociate with the group of their own volition,
we are interested in understanding which member is
the most vulnerable group member to target with an
incentive to facilitate their leaving of the group.
After making the case for a model for group stability
that considers social comparison and group norms in the
next subsections we describe the constituent parts of
the mathematical model and its underpinnings from an
analytic perspective.
A. Short Run
We now present the additive social comparison model
courtesy of [16] for the short run. In this model, individ-
uals choose how much effort to put into an action (that
is related to the purpose of the group) given their ability
in that task, which is a personal, unobservable, and
heterogeneous trait, as well as subjective social compar-
ison. In this model, an individual’s private ability/fitness
to perform tasks related to that goal is captured by
their type θ ∈ [θ,θ]. We assume this parameter does not
change in the time-scale of consideration. An individual
considers their type in choosing their effort which leads
to their (observable) action a≥ 0.
Individuals are rarely rewarded for unobservable ef-
fort - rather, outcomes typically depend on actions. Thus,
there is a trade-off for each individual, between the
rewards related to taking an action, and the cost of the
effort it requires. This internal trade-off is further com-
plicated by the psychological effects of social comparison.
This is the central question of the short-run model.
The utility that an individual derives from compar-
ison against their reference group depends on a char-
acterization of the group’s actions, e.g. via the mean
observed action a∗. To estimate this value accurately,
individuals must accumulate information, therefore this
representative action may not always align with the true
population mean. However, as an individual encounter
more and more people, the empirical mean observed
action will converge to the mean of the distribution.
In this time-frame, group norms and identities can be
assumed to be fixed.
B. Medium run
In the medium run, we focus on group effects. We
assume that the short run dynamics have reached an
equilibrium, such that the perception of a∗ by group
members has converged to the real population average,
and individuals receive a utility of usr(θ) from the short-
run dynamics.
The group has a salience to an individual that is
captured through a parameter γ ∈ [γ,γ]. This parameter
can also model how important a group is to a person’s
self-concept, or, inversely, how difficult a group is to leave
(i.e., what adverse consequences would result from such
an action). In effect, this acts as a “friction” term that
keeps group members inside the group. For example,
for a minimal group, γ would be small, while it would
be large for a group that is especially important to an
individual’s self-concept (as described in identity fusion
theory). We assume that this parameter is fixed in the
short and medium run. Thus, we can assume that there
is a probability density function P(θ,γ) over the set of
(θ,γ) pairs which describes the population. Note that this
allows there to be a possible correlation between ability
and salience of the group to the individual.
Each individual, knowing their private ability and
the salience of the group to them, takes the action
they believe other group members expect someone in
their situation to take (normative expectations). We
consider quantify the preferences of the individuals over
these norm-related actions through a function, bn(θ,γ),
that considers the net effect of these actions on the
individual. For example, some norms may involve some
group members helping other in-group members. In
these circumstances, adhering to normative expectations
may not just place no burden on the individual being
helped, they might also decrease the effort they need
to exert in completing the task. On the other hand,
the additional burden on the helpers/donors may make
group membership less desirable to them.
Each individual will also have expectations about
norm-related behavior from other group-members. These
expectations will be empirical [25], and will align with
their observed behavior. We quantify the preference of
an individual over these empirical actions through the
function be(θ,γ), which signifies the understanding of
the individual about the actions taken by other group
members given their private information (translated to
the same scale as bn(θ,γ)).
There may arise a case where an individual’s em-
pirical expectations conflict with their normative ones.
This will be the case when the behavior they observe
from others is incompatible with the behavior they deem
the others expect from them. Under these conditions,
the normative expectation will be amended over time
to be compatible with the empirical expectation [25].
Since we are not explicitly concerned with the process
under which these changes happen, we consider the end-
result, whereby we have a convergence of bn and be to
a compatible functional description of the norm, b(θ,γ).
This would be the shared norm that is enforced by the
group in the medium run, possibly through sanctions
[39]. While there is significant work in understanding
sanctioning decisions and their effect on norms, we do
not consider them explicitly in this framework.1
For this norm to be self-compatible, it must be possible
for each individual in the group to perform the action
which they believe the norm prescribes for them, and
1In the long-run, we discuss the fact that leaving the group would
result in the loss of the benefit gained from group membership
(codified in our model through γ). This loss can capture the effect
of ostracization and sanctions for not abiding by norms.
for other group members to be able to sustain the
expectations of an individual.
C. Long run
In the medium run, we assumed that individuals have
“learned” the norms of the group (e.g., perceived norms
of group members and collective norms have converged).
In the long-run, given that even the group itself is
not considered fixed, we focus on the stability of the
group. In particular, we discuss each individual’s choice
of whether to remain in the group and to be bound by
its norms, or to leave the group and risk sanctions by
group members. The preference is codified through a
comparison of the individual’s utility within the group
and outside the group.
Leaving the group would also modify the expected
short-run and medium-run utility of the individual, so
as in the short-run, and outside the group, the individual
will be deprived of the feedback provided by observing
the actions of group-members. This would translate to
a change in an individual’s utility function, and there-
fore their chosen action. The medium-run effects we
described are both related to group membership, and will
have no effect once the individual leaves the group2.
1) Long run group stability: Individuals make the
decision to leave the group or to stay by considering
their preference over these choices, as captured by a
comparison of total in-group utility with that they could
expect to sustain outside the group in the short and
medium run:
umr(θ,γ)+usr(θ)≥ uomr(θ,γ)+uosr(θ), (1)
where usr(θ) and umr(θ,γ) (respectively uosr(θ) and
uomr(θ,γ)) are an individual’s expected short-run and
medium-run utility inside (outside) the group. Note that
the difference between the two sides of the inequality
represents the starkness of the difference between the
choices for (θ,γ)-individuals. One can think of this differ-
ence as representing the additional encouragement (in
the form of outside incentives) the individual would need
to be convinced to leave the group (such as the rewards
offered to members of terrorist groups to facilitate their
de-radicalization [40]).
We can now provide a mathematical definition for
long-run stability S of a group: S is the minimum
additional incentive that has to be offered to group
members to cause one of them to leave in the long run:
S :=min
k≥0
k (2)
s.t. umr(θ,γ)+usr(θ)−uomr(θ,γ)−uosr(θ)≤ k ∃θ,γ.
Notice that if (1) does not hold for an individual in the
group, then by default S = 0. In such cases, one can use
this framework to study how many individuals would
2This is due to the way we have encoded γ. One can equally plausibly
define γ to emphasize the relative dis-utility of being in the out-group.
have to leave the group to make it stable, potentially
via computational simulations.
In the long run, we seek to study what type of shared
norms maximize the stability of a groups. In this study
we are not investigating how these norms are generated
nor the exact mechanisms by which they are maintained,
but only on their effect on the mutability of the group.
One could also add other constraints on the group
norm that align with theory. For example, it has been
argued that a complementary measure of fairness of a
norm is required to capture effects such as inequality
aversion. One such constraint could penalize norms that
place large expectations, or give large benefits, to a
subset of people.
III. CONCLUSIONS,CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have described a mathematical
framework for social group mutability. We show how
various interdependent and independent processes that
have been seen to affect group mutability can be cap-
tured in an economics-inspired mathematical model.
This is a significant step in understanding the possible
interactions between these phenomena that may be hard
to see in laboratory experiments. Understanding this
interplay mathematically will allow us to posit exper-
imentable hypotheses about these interactions.
In future work, we will use this framework to inte-
grate specific mathematical models for group mutability-
relevant phenomena, and create optimization-based
models of individual behavior. While the outcome of
these models typically depends upon socially-inspired
parameters, it is often difficult to estimate these param-
eters from data. This is both due to the crudeness of the
models and the unavailability of enough data for model
fitting. However, such estimation and fitting is necessary
to generate exact hypotheses for specific experiments,
and is thus an important step in our future work.
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